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Gray: The Historical Context of §402A

REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORICAL
CONTEXT OF SECTION 402A
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you Mr. Crofton. It takes all of my self-control not to
respond to some of the comments regarding the jury selection
process. We may get to that later. We will move ahead to Professor Gray.
ProfessorOscar S. Gray*:
It is probably unnecessary for me to remind you that the
American Law Institute is not a law-making body. It is a private
organization that publishes works that attempt to be scholarly. 1 It
does not make much difference whether the form of the publication embodies recommendations that purport to be either black
letter or commentary. Neither the comments nor the black letter
is law. There is no way to expect any predictability or precision
in actual results when we are talking about a common law field.
The law that emerges will depend on the extent to which courts
all over the country find it advisable to follow the suggestions of
the Institute. 2 Whether or not they follow the recommendations
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A. 1948,
J.D. 1951, Yale Law School.

1. The American Law Institute consists of a group of distinguished "legal
scholars who are responsible for the Restatements in the various disciplines of
the law....

."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 82 (6th ed. 1990). "The particular

business and objects of the society are educational, and are to promote the
clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social

needs, to secure the better administration ofjustice, and to encourage and carry
on scholarly and scientific legal work." The American Law Institute, 68
A.L.I. PRoC. 883 (1992).

2. Many courts throughout the country have followed the
recommendations of the American Law Institute, particularly with regard to
§ 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard
& Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111, 113 (N.H. 1969), in which the court stated:
The basis for the present rule of strict liability is the 'ancient one of
special responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken by one who
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will not depend on the difference between black letter and commentary; instead, it will depend on how persuasive we are in the
view of the events. The quest for certainty in the law is not only
illusory, in general, but is specifically not assured of fulfillment
by the work that we are now engaged in reconsidering Restate3
ment (Second) of Torts section 402A.

enters into the business of supplying human being[s] with products
which may endanger the safety of their persons and property and forced
reliance upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such
goods.'
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965)); see
also West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 89 (Fla. 1976) (holding
that manufacturer may be liable under § 402A, as distinct from breach of
implied warranty of merchantability, for injury to user of product and to
bystander); Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 518 P.2d 857, 859 (Idaho 1974)
(adopting § 402A to find chemical company liable for damage to wholesaler's
seed beans); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co,, 174 N.W.2d 672,
684 (Iowa 1970) (adopting principles found in § 402A where automobile
brakes were defectively manufactured); Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 380
N.E.2d 653, 660 (Mass. 1978) (holding manufacturer strictly liable under
§ 402A for unreasonably dangerous design of hockey helmet); Webb v. Zern,
220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966) (adopting § 402A to find manufacturer liable
for injuries sustained by explosion of beer keg); Herbert v. Loveless, 474
S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (stating that "Texas is firmly
committed to the rule stated in... section 402A . . . ."); Earnest W. Hahn,
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979) (adopting the
language of § 402A by finding manufacturer of steel joists strictly liable when
mall collapsed due to their defective condition).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This provision
provides in relevant part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably

dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relationship with the seller.
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First, I would like to address a few points made by Mr.
Crofton. Mr. Crofton has pointed out something very important
on a matter I respect, but about which I was not at all certain.
Those of you who have read the Cornell Law Review article, by

Professors Henderson and Twerski, 4 may recall an assertion to
the effect that liability for unknowable risks is uninsurable. 5 This
assertion struck me as questionable. It is a very serious matter if
it is correct, because it seems to me that one of the social objectives we ought to pursue is commercial stability. It is important
that we have an economy that works. It is also important that
honest businesses are not judged unbusinesslike. Businesses ought
to have the means available to them for providing an orderly way
of assessing liability. 6 Therefore, to the extent that liability could

be uninsurable, we would be talking about something that is not
advisable. I am, therefore, glad to hear from Mr. Crofton, if I
Id.
4. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The ProposedRevision
of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
1512 (1992).
5. Id. at 1517. The article states: "[I]nsurers cannot provide coverage for
unforeseeable or indeterminable risks. Furthermore, to impose liability for
unforeseeable and hence incalculable risks would violate a manufacturer's right
to be held to a liability standard that it is capable of meeting." Id. The authors
propose to resolve this problem by applying a risk-utility balancing "to
determine which risks are more fairly and efficiently borne by product sellers,
and thus by users generally, and which should be borne by individual [1
product users who suffer injury." Id.
6. See Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The AntiCompetitive Impact of U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Businesses
Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9 J.L. & CoM. 167 (1989). "Clearly, the
widespread availability of product liability insurance at a reasonable cost is
central to the validity of [a strict products liability] theory." Id. at 175. In
essence, strict liability presumes that "the corporations making and selling a
product are in the best position to insure against the risk of injury from that
product." Id. at 174-75. "[Corporations can pass on any increased costs they
incur to consumers through a modest increase in product price." Id. at 175.
This theory is known as a "cost-shifting" mechanism which "shift[s] the
economic costs of physical and mental injury from the person injured, to the
maker or seller of the product that caused the injury." Id. at 174 (citing
George L. Priest, The Current Insuring Crisis and the Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1534-36 (1987)).
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understood him correctly, that the problem for insurers is not that
unforeseeable risks of physical damage are uninsurable. 7 They
can be insured, as long as insurers understand the existence of liability and the present state of the law. 8 The risk that undermines
the insurability of hazards, more than the risk of strict liability
for unknowable hazards, is the risk of changes in the law. 9 That
accords with what would have been my guess. However, it is
comforting that it seems so to Mr. Crofton as well.
One obvious consequence of the risk of changes in the law is
that insurers should have understood forty years ago that the state
of American liability law would expand liability. 10 By now,
Lloyds of London, and all insurers, should understand that there
is much liability for defective products. Therefore, they cannot
rely on any assumption that our understanding of defectiveness
will not increase in the future. The expansion of liability should
not come as a big surprise to insurers. Insurers' tasks should not
be rendered unworkable if we were simply to follow section
402A in its most rigorous form, including strict liability for de7. See Michael Crofton, From a Defense Attorney's Perspective: "There
Is No FreeLunch," 10 TouRo L. REv. 57, 58 (1993).
8. See Cortese & Blaner, supra note 6, at 182. At the time strict liability
began expanding, insurers could not predict when a court would find a
manufacturer liable for unforeseeable product defects. Therefore, insurance
actuary tables did not calculate unpredictable risks into the premiums. As a

result, insurance companies were paying for these unforeseeable defects in
product liability suits. Soon thereafter, insurance companies dramatically
increased premiums, decreased coverage and sometimes refused coverage
altogether. Id.

9. In 1986, Congress recognized "the inherent unpredictability of the tort
litigation system, as well as the increasing difficulty of predicting potential
losses due to expanding concepts of liability" to be contributing factors to the

growing product liability litigation and unaffordability of liability insurance.
S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986).
10. The purpose of § 402A, at the time of its promulgation, was to expand

recovery for claims of harms caused by products which were defective or
dangerous to the consumer. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960)
[hereinafter Assault Upon the Citadel]; William L. Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 790 (1966)
[hereinafter Fall of the Citadel].

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss1/6

4

Gray: The Historical Context of §402A

1993]

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF § 4024

sign defects1 1 and warning defects. 12 We can take some comfort

from the proposition that expansion of liability is not a reason for
revising section 402A.
Now, I would like to revert to some doctrinal analysis and try

to focus what we are talking about in a doctrinal context. You
may then decide, after we have been through the exercise, that
you want to follow my colleagues, Professors Henderson and
Twerski, in the future.
13
Section 402A, when it was promulgated a generation ago,
was a section providing something supplemental to a body of
highly developed negligence and other tort law. 14 The relevant
11. See Gary C. Robb, A PracticalApproach to Use of State of the Art
Evidence in Strict ProductsLiability Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 17 (1982).
The author reports that courts have recognized four different definitions of
defective design: 1. "the consumer expectations approach" (reasonable
consumer could not have anticipated the unsafe conditions of the product); 2.
"a risk/utility or feasibility analysis" (the risks of the product's design
outweigh its benefits); 3. "a negligence or reasonableness standard" (the
manufacturer did not act as a reasonable prudent person in designing the
product); and 4. "a prima facie defect theory" (plaintiff establishes that the
product caused the injury). Id. at 17-19.
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965)
(providing that unavoidably unsafe products are not defective if accompanied
by adequate warning); see also M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in
Products Liability: Contours and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 221, 223
(1987):
To be adequate under any theory of liability, a necessary warning, by its
size, location and intensity of language or symbol, must be calculated to
impress upon a reasonable prudent user of the product the nature and
extent of the hazard involved. The language used must be direct and
should, where applicable, describe methods of safe use. An adequate
warning should also be timely and should advise of significant hazards
from reasonably foreseeable misuse of the product and, where
appropriate, antidotes for misuse.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
13. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was promulgated in
1965.
14. The founders of § 402A sought to expedite consumers' claims of
personal injuries against manufacturers for product defects by utilizing a strict
liability approach, rather than through tort or warranty law which proved to
constrain the consumers' claims. See Fall of the Citadel, supra note 10;
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context also included, outside of tort law, a body of applicable
statutory law under the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 which gave
rise to warranty law. 16 It was entirely clear under section 402A
that there was nothing in it intending to displace the effect that
would normally be expected from the balance of the Restatement
of Torts. 17 In fact, section 402A comment a has an explicit sentence which says, in effect, to the extent that a party can make a
George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZo
L. REv. 2301 (1989).
15. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315, 2-316, 2-317, 2-318, 2-715
(1993). The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted by every state except
Louisiana.
16. Some courts decided that consumers of defective products could
proceed against manufacturers under either strict products liability or warranty
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., Superwood Corp. v.
Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981) (Uniform
Commercial Code was not "intended to preempt the entire area of products
liability, [instead s]trict products liability developed in large part to fill gaps in
the law of sales with respect to consumer purchases.") (citations omitted),
overruled by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990); Santer
v. A & M Karaghieusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965) (finding that
ultimate purchaser of defective carpeting who suffered economic losses could
bring action against manufacturer for either breach of implied warranty of
fitness or strict liability in tort); cf. Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353
A.2d 581 (Del. 1976) (holding that bailor of rented truck may be liable for
strict liability in tort for personal injuries to bailee and for damage to
bystander's property caused by defective brakes). The court noted that the
Uniform Commercial Code did not preempt products liability for bailments,
instead it only offered guidance. Id. at 584 n.6. However, the majority of
courts precluded economic recovery based on strict products liability in tort,
and based recovery solely on the Uniform Commercial Code. In the seminal
decision of Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965), the court
would not permit recovery of lost profits based on strict products liability
because the law of sales governs commercial transactions. Id. at 151. See also
Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25
(S.D. Iowa 1973); Miehle Co. v. Smith-Brooks Printing Co., 303 F. Supp.
501 (D. Colo. 1969); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279
(Alaska 1978); Beauchamp v. Wilson, 515 P.2d 41 (Ariz. 1973); Cline v.
Prowler Indus. of Maryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980); Long v. Jim
Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 581 P.2d 784 (Idaho 1978); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v.
Continental Can Co., 219 N.E.2d 726 (I11.
1966); Marcil v. John Deere Indus.
Equip. Co., 403 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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negligence case, that law remains independent of section 402A. 18
I think section 402A should be understood as having developed as

a result of the evolution of both negligence and warranty laws to
protect people who were injured by dangerous products. 19

Historically, if you think back to the state of the law at the turn
of the century or the early years of the twentieth century, the
problems that an injured consumer faced were largely in the area
of negligence law. 20 The manufacturer was insulated from liability by privity doctrines which arose out of Winterbottom v.
Wright.2 1 Later, in the 20th century, the privity barrier was
eliminated as a result of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 22

Therefore, it was possible for an injured consumer to successfully
sue a manufacturer in negligence, as long as the consumer could
18. Id. at cmt. a. Comment a provides in pertinent part: "The rule stated
here is not exclusive, and does not preclude liability based upon the alternative
ground of negligence of the seller, where such negligence can be proved." Id.
19. See generally Priest, supra note 14.
20. See generally L. W. Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19
MINN. L. REV. 752 (1935) (discussing the development and expansion of tort
law liability without privity of contract by reason of negligently defective
products); A. J. Russell, Manufacturers' Liability to the Ultimate Consumer,
21 KY. L.J. 388 (1932) (analyzing manufacturers' liability to third parties on
basis of negligence for defective food or drugs); Lindsey R. Jeanblanc,
Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other than Their Immediate
Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937) (discussing the liability of manufacturer
to the ultimate purchaser on basis of negligence).
21. 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exh. 1842). In Winterbottom,
plaintiff contracted with a sub-contractor of defendant for a "fit, proper, safe
and secure" mail-coach. Id., 152 Eng. Rep. at 402-03. While plaintiff was
driving the mail-coach in a proper manner, the mail-coach broke down and
plaintiff was thrown from it, causing physical injuries to him. Id. at 110, 152
Eng. Rep. at 403. The court stated that "[u]nless we confine the operation of
such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and
outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue." Id. at
114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
22. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (holding manufacturer, who
sold automobile with defective wooden wheel to a retail dealer, liable for
injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of collapsed wheel which had been
initially purchased from another manufacturer). "There is nothing anomalous
in a rule which imposes upon A, who has contracted with B, a duty to C and D
and others according as he knows or does not know that the subject-matter of
the contract is intended for their use." Id. at 393, 111 N.E. at 1054.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1993

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1993], Art. 6

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

prove negligence. Negligence was either proven by actual evidence 23 or by res ipsa loquitur.24 However, at times, there remained difficulties in the proof of negligence. 25
23. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 F. 878 (2d Cir.
1919) (holding corporation manufacturing automobiles negligent for injuries
sustained as a result of a defective wheel that corporation purchased from
another manufacturer); Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693 (Mass. 1946)
(holding manufacturer of perfume liable in negligence for second degree bums
sustained by plaintiff who purchased the perfume from a retail shop); Hoenig
v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E.2d 415 (1936) (holding that
manufacturer of a coffee urn, who sold it to a distributor, then a retailer and
ultimately to a social organization, was negligent for injuries sustained when
one of the handles broke off); Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181
N.E. 579 (1932) (holding manufacturer, who filled bottle with soda and then
placed it on the market, negligent for injuries caused by an explosion of the
bottle); Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 563 (1923)
(holding manufacturer who shipped electric current transformer liable for
negligent conduct to an injured employee for failing to give buyer/employer
notice of the potential dangers); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E.
275 (1922) (holding public weighers hired by a seller to weigh bags of beans
liable to purchaser of goods for negligent weighing).
24. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944)
(relying on res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference that manufacturer's
negligence was responsible for defective condition of a bottle of Coca Cola at
the time it was delivered to restaurant); Bressler v. New York Rapid Transit
Corp., 277 N.Y. 200, 13 N.E.2d 772 (1938) (applying doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to prove negligence where pane of glass in railroad car spontaneously
shattered); Hake v. George Wiedemann Brewing Co., 262 N.E.2d 703 (Ohio
1970) (holding that the trier of fact may infer negligence from surrounding
circumstances under doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where plaintiff suffered
injuries as a result of empty beer keg that rolled off second story stairway
platform).
25. See, e.g., Boyd v. American Can Co., 249 A.D. 644, 291 N.Y.S. 205
(2d Dep't 1936) (holding manufacturer of a can and key appliance not liable
for injury that was not reasonably foreseeable), aff'd, 274 N.Y. 526, 10
N.E.2d 532 (1937); Liedeker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 249 A.D. 835, 292
N.Y.S. 541 (2d Dep't) (holding manufacturer of collapsible beach chair not
liable for injuries that are not reasonably probable), aff'd, 247 N.Y. 631, 10
N.E.2d 586 (1937); Cullem v. M. H. Renken Dairy Co., 247 A.D. 742, 285
N.Y.S. 707 (2d Dep't 1936) (holding manufacturer of milk bottle not liable to
customer for injury sustained while washing bottle given the lack of direct
proof that bottle was defective and exercise of reasonable and ordinary care by
manufacturer). When plaintiffs could not prove negligence, some brought
claims against manufacturers for injuries arising from products based on other
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In the meantime, there was a background in commercial law of

26
strict liability for harm caused by unmerchantable products.

The barrier to recovery under strict liability was the predominant
use of contract defenses, by manufacturers, through the use of

28
such things as disclaimers 27 and limitations of liability.

Thereafter, the decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.2 9 initiated the wholesale amelioration of the insulating effect
theories, such as misrepresentation. See, e.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12
P.2d 409 (sufficient for liability that injury arose from shattered windshield
which was described by manufacturer as "shatter proof"), aff'd, 15 P.2d 1118
(Wash. 1932).
26. See, e.g., Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.,
90 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1958) (holding manufacturer of defective cinder blocks
liable on basis of negligence or implied warranty to buyer who had no direct
relations with manufacturer); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 253
S.W.2d 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (finding that manufacturer of defective skin
detergent may be liable on basis of breach of warranty for injuries to ultimate
consumer); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio
1958) (holding manufacturer liable on basis of express warranty for harm
caused to ultimate purchaser who relied on manufacturer's advertisements of
product quality and merit); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164
S.W.2d 828 ('ex. 1942) (holding non-negligent manufacturer of contaminated
food liable on basis of implied warranty for injuries to ultimate consumer).
27. The Uniform Sales Act § 71, and its successor, the Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-316 permit disclaimers to defeat warranties. Uniform
Sales Act § 71 (1909); U.C.C. § 2-316 (1993). See, e.g., Gibson v. California
Spray-Chem. Corp., 188 P.2d 316 (Wash. 1948) (finding that express
disclaimer of warranty in sale of chemical compound precluded recovery for
damages to apple crop whether the product was or was not used in accordance
with directions); Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931)
(upholding disclaimer of warranty clause within a sales contract regarding the
productivity and quality of crop of Japanese onion sets); Seattle Seed Co. v.
Fujimori, 139 P. 866 (Wash. 1914) (holding purchaser of seed peas bound by
an express disclaimer which waived all responsibility for the crop).
28. See, e.g., Sharples Separator Co. v. Domestic Elec. Refrigerator
Corp., 61 F.2d 499 (3d Cir. 1932) (permitting manufacturer of refrigerators to
limit liability by providing an exclusive remedy for breach of warranty).
29. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (holding manufacturer liable for breach of
implied warranty of merchantability when plaintiff suffered injuries from
accident caused by defective steering mechanism although the purchase order
contained disclaimer of all express and implied warranties not contained in the

order).
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of disclaimers. 30 With Henningsen, the pendulum shifted from
negligence to warranty law as the best vehicle for protecting
consumers.31
Warranty law, however, still had many disadvantages which

caused some problems, such as privity requirements 32 and requirements in commercial statutes for certain types of notice to
persons against whom warranty claims were invoked. 33 In the
important case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,34 the

California Supreme Court resurrected the tort background of
warranty law by taking the position that warranty liability existed

30. See id. In Henningsen, the court expressed its disfavor of disclaimers,
and construed them strictly against the seller. Id. at 77-78. The court rejected,
as contrary to public policy, the manufacturer's disclaimer of all warranties to
the replacement of defective parts. Id. at 95.
31. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 430 S.W.2d 778 (Ark. 1968);
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1963); Crown v. Cecil
Holland Ford, Inc., 207 So. 2d 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449
(Iowa 1961); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
32. See, e.g., Conner v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 855
(W.D. Mo. 1939) (holding that implied warranty of food does not extend to
third persons who eat the food, but only to those who buy the food);
Welshausen v. Charles Parker Co., 76 A. 271 (Conn. 1910) (finding no
implied or express breach of warranty where subpurchaser brought suit against
manufacturer for injuries sustained by defective gun); Pearl v. William
Filene's Sons Co., 58 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. 1945) (holding that husband cannot
recover consequential damages from seller of hair product which injured wife
because no contract existed between husband and seller); Bowman Biscuit Co.
v. Hines, 251 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1952) (holding wholesaler/middleman not
liable to person who purchased contaminated food from retailer); Prisen v.
Russos, 215 N.W. 905 (Wisc. 1927) (holding restaurant owner not liable to
wife for contaminated ham where husband purchased the ham for his wife).
33. The Uniform Sales Act § 49 and its successor, the Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-607(3) require a buyer to give notice to the seller within
a reasonable time after he knows or should have known of the breach, in order
for the buyer to recover based on warranty law. Uniform Sales Act § 49
(1909); U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (1993).
34. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (finding that a manufacturer may be held
strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by defective power tool given to
plaintiff as gift from his wife who purchased from retailer).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss1/6

10

Gray: The Historical Context of §402A

19931

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF § 4024

in tort, parallel to its existence in commercial law, and independ-

ent of some of the statutory restrictions in commercial statutes. 35
Professor Twerski spoke to us about the early history of section
402A. 36 My memory is not exact, however my recollection is
that it was Greenman that led to section 402A in its present
form. 37 It is true that William Prosser's original draft of section

402A preceded Greenman.3 8 However, Dean Prosser's earlier

39
drafts were limited to particular types of products, such as food
and those for intimate bodily use. 4° The drafts of section 402A

applied only for those types of products until the decision of
Greenman.4 1 The effect of Greenman was to encourage the
American Law Institute, on the strength of one case, to expand
35. Id. at 901. The court in Greenmanheld:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. The liability
is not one governed by the law of contract warrantiesbut by the law of
strict liability in tort.
Id.
36. See Aaron D. Twerski, From A Reporter: A Prospective Agenda, 10
Touio L. REv. 5, 9-11 (1993).
37. See John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their
Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 551, 554 (1980). Justice Traynor's decision,
in Greenman, was simultaneous to his membership in the Reporter's Advisory
Committee and the Council of the American Law Institute, during which he
participated in the critical stages of drafting § 402A. In the final draft of §
402A, William Prosser did not suggest Greenman as either an authority, or a
different approach to strict products liability in tort. Almost instantly,
however, numerous jurisdictions adopted § 402A and Greenman as the
predominant authorities of products liability. Id. at 554-55.
38. In 1963, Greenman was one of the first cases to apply a tort theory of
strict liability, but it was not until 1964 that § 402A of Restatement (Second)
of Torts was accepted by the American Law Institute.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 6,
1961).

40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 7,
1962).
41. RESTATEhMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10,
1964). The Greenman decision applied strict liability in tort to a defective
home carpentry outfit. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897

(Cal. 1963).
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strict liability in tort, previously recognized for food 42 and cosmetics, 4 3 to the entire range of unreasonably dangerous and de-

fective products. It was a bold step initially recognized by only
one case, but ultimately validated by a widespread consensus
throughout the country. 44 Its ruling was the direction in which
the common law wanted to grow.
What made it so widespread? It became so widespread because
it reflected well developed concepts already well advanced in
negligence and warranty laws. As an outgrowth of negligence
law, it recognized, at least with regard to manufacturing defects,
that if you used a somewhat liberal application of res ipsa loquitur and similar doctrines, it was easy to persuade courts, under

conventional doctrines, that there was probably some negligence
42. See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913);
Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 25 P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1933); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich
Co., 93 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1939); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 19 So. 2d 313
(Fla. 1944); Criswell Baking Co. v. Milligan, 50 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. App.
1948); Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 74 N.E.2d 162 (Ill. 1947); Davis
v. Van Camp Packing Co., 176 N.W. 382 (Iowa 1920); Parks v. C.C. Yost
Pie Co., 144 P. 202 (Kan. 1914); LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 60 So. 2d 873 (La. 1952); Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman,
64 So. 791 (Miss. 1914); Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
90 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. App. 1936); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 161 N.E.
557 (Ohio App. 1928); Griffin v. Asbury, 165 P.2d 822 (Okla. 1945); Jacob
E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1942); Swift & Co. v.
Wells, 110 S.E.2d 203 (Va. 1959).
43. See, e.g., Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 269 P.2d 413 (Kan. 1954)
(hair dye); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 253 S.W.2d 532 (Mo.
App. 1952) (detergent used for hands); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,
147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958) (permanent wave solution).
44. Courts have extended strict liability to a wide variety of products. See,
e.g., Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1986) (asbestos
products); Lily-Tulip Cup Corp. v. Bernstein, 181 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1966)
(paper cups); Home v. Liberty Furniture Co., 452 So. 2d 204 (La. App.
1984) (chairs); Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 188 N.W.2d 426
(Minn. 1971) (bottles of soda); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
406 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1979) (sheet metal rolling machine); McCown v.
International Harvester Co., 342 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1975) (tractor wheel); Schriner
v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 501 A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(electric power); Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31
(S.D. 1983) (clothes dryer).
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if the wheels fell off a car, and it was not worth the administrative expenses of forcing the plaintiff to prove it. 45 The warranty
background initiated the notion that products causing harm be-

cause of unmerchantable qualities are subject to strict liability
without having to worry about negligence. 46 Fault simply had
nothing to do with it. 47 Section 402A put those two ideas to48

gether.
However, section 402A also generated a lot of subsidiary doctrines which were confusing because of the verbiage. We have
heard, for instance, about "risk-utility" analyses 49 and
45. See Page Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the Manufacturer's
Negligence, 49 VA. L. REv. 675 (1963). The majority of jurisdictions have
adopted the principle of res ipsa loquitur. See, e.g., Bissonette v. National
Biscuit Co., 100 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1939); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.

Davidson, 102 S.W.2d 833 (Ark. 1937); Dryden v. Continental Baking Co.,
77 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1938); Gross v. Loft, Inc., 185 A. 80 (Conn. 1936); Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Creech, 53 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. Ct. App. 1932);
Richenbacher v. California Packing Corp., 145 N.E. 281 (Mass. 1924);
Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365 (Miss. 1918). Similar
doctrines were applied by other jurisdictions. Pennsylvania applied an
"exclusive control" doctrine, which allows a negligence recovery when
defendant controls and manages the cause of the injury. See Loch v. Confair,
93 A.2d 451, 453 (Pa. 1953). South Carolina and Maine used circumstantial
evidence to accomplish the same result as res ipsa loquitur. See, e.g., Lajoie
v. Bilodeau, 93 A.2d 719 (Me. 1953); Merchant v. Columbia Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 51 S.E.2d 749 (S.C. 1949).
46. See Assault of the Citadel, supra note 10; Fall of the Citadel, supra
note 10.
47. W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48
TEX. L. REV. 398, 407-08 (1970). It is entirely irrelevant in strict liability
cases if the manufacturer "was excusably unaware of the extent of the danger
and had not committed any negligent act or omission that caused the danger..
.. "Id.
48. See generally Priest, supra note 14; Assault Upon the Citadel, supra
note 10; Fall of the Citadel,supra note 10.
49. The risk-utility analysis, balancing the risks inherent in the design of a
product with the benefits of the product, has been adopted by numerous
jurisdictions to provide strict liability for defective products. See, e.g.,

Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 181 (5th Cir.
1990) (applying Louisiana statute requiring plaintiff to prove safer alternative
design and the "risk avoided by using the alternative design... would have
exceeded the burden of switching to the alternative design .
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"consumer expectation" tests. 50 Those doctrines can best be
understood by reference to the background of negligence law and

warranty law. I think "risk-utility" analysis was originally an
inelegant way of referring to established doctrines for the analysis
of unreasonableness of risk in negligence law, 5 1 which, as Mr.
Vargo pointed out quite correctly, really transcends the ranking
of quanifications. 52 We have instead, in negligence law, a moral
dimension, 53 but its evaluation does involve comparisons. There
denied, 1993 WL 248287 (1993); Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883
F.2d 1223, 1227 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying Pennsylvania law by "evaluat[ing]
the risks of a product versus its social utility . . . ." (citations omitted)). Some
jurisdictions have applied both a risk-utility analysis and a consumer
expectation test. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 458 (Cal.
1978) (applying the risk-utility analysis and the consumer expectation test to
find a manufacturer strictly liable for defective high lift loader). Cf. Camacho
v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246 (Colo. 1987) (applying risk-utility
analysis and explicitly rejecting the application of consumer expectation test
because it does not focus on "the nature of the product ....
"), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
50. The consumer expectation test was adopted in § 402A comment i and
asks whether the product, as sold, was "dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
51. See 1A Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 3.03(4), at 3-609 to 3-610 (1991); Guido Calabresi & Jon T.
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055,
1060 (1972); Christine M. Moylan, In Pursuit of the Appropriate Standard of
Liabilityfor Defective ProductDesigns, 42 ME. L. REv. 453, 462-63 (1990).
52. See John Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the A.L. L Erode Strict Liability
in the Restatement (Third) for Products Liability?, 10 TOURO L. REV. 21
(1993).
53. John Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person'sAccess to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1626-29 (1993).
According to Mr. Vargo, risk-utility analysis should not be the only factor to
determining economic efficiency. Mr. Vargo quotes Andreas Teuber, who
believes morality should be a factor when determining risk-utility analysis
'[b]ecause it fails to respect the distinctiveness of people's responses to
risks, or to do justice to the morally significant ways in which risks can
be distributed, or to give proper weight to the importance we attach to
human life in situations of felt urgency, or to capture the special
significance of our concern for autonomy and rights, cost-benefit
analysis cannot yield the same result as individual consent. For these
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is a valid notion that some investments in safety become too

costly, while other investments are worthwhile. You have to
compare what you are investing with what you can afford in
order to explain why you think some failures to invest further are
unreasonable and others are not. 54
Similarly, I think, as Mr. Vargo suggests, the test under section 402A represents negligence law with an imputation of
knowledge. 55 Under section 402A, the issue is often whether it
would have been negligent for someone who had actually known
of the hazard to have put the product on the market. 56 The
reasons we should not be persuaded to allow cost-benefit analysis to
determine public policy-to do, as it were our talking for us.'
Id. at 1628-29 (quoting Andreas Teuber, Justifying Risk, DAEDALUS 247, Fall
1990; see also David G. Owen, The Moral Foundationsof Products Liability
Law: TowardFirst Principles, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 427 (1993).
54. See Vargo, supra note 53, at 1628 ("The core of any economic
analysis is the measurement of 'economic costs' and 'economic benefits.'"
(footnote omitted)).
55. See Vargo, supra note 52, at 24-25. Imputation of knowledge occurs
when knowledge of a danger is imputed to the manufacturer. The manufacturer
is strictly liable for manufacturing defects regardless of its knowledge of the
defect. Therefore, the plaintiff does not have to prove negligence by the
manufacturer. The plaintiff, however, must demonstrate that the "reasonable
manufacturer knowing of the product's danger would have changed the product
before marketing it." Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death
of Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV.
1183, 1192-93 (1992). See also James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the
Time Dimension in ProductsLiability, 69 CAL. L. Rsv. 919, 928 (1981). The
author refers to imputation of knowledge as the "Wade-Keeton" test, which
questions "whether a reasonable manufacturer, knowing of the design hazards
that are known at the time of trial, would have designed and marketed the
product in the same manner as did the defendant." Id. (footnotes omitted);
Moylan, supra note 51, at 466. The author refers to imputation of knowledge
as the "'reasonably prudent manufacturer'" test, which "balances the risks of
the product against its utility, imputing knowledge of the risks to the
manufacturer." Id.
56. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (holding
manufacturer of drug strictly liable where manufacturer did not have
knowledge at time of the marketing that the drug had the side effect of tooth
discoloration). The court stated:
The question in strict liability design-defect and warning cases is
whether, assuming that the manufacturer knew of the defect in the
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"consumer expectation" test is simply the flip side of that under
warranty law. 57 The question is whether the product would have

product, he acted in a reasonably prudent manner in marketing the
product or in providing the warnings given. Thus, once the defendant's
knowledge of the defect is imputed, strict liability analysis becomes
almost identical to negligence analysis in its focus on the reasonableness
of the defendant's conduct.
Id. at 385; Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974)
(finding manufacturer of defective sanding machine strictly liable for injuries
sustained by plaintiff). In Phillips, the court used the test of "whether the
seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk involved.
Strict liability imposes what amounts to constructive knowledge of the
condition of the product." Id. at 1036 (citations omitted).
57. See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15, 19 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. 1988) (finding that under Massachusetts law, the expectations of a
reasonable consumer determine whether or not goods are merchantable);
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) (finding that the
consumer expectation test "reflects the warranty heritage upon which
California product liability doctrine in part rests"); Robert F. Cochran, Jr.,
DangerousProducts and Injured Bystanders, 81 Ky. L.J. 687, 692-93 (1993).
The author recognizes the similarities between the consumer expectation test
and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Under section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code, sale of a
product by a merchant carries with it an implied warranty of
merchantability. A warranty of merchantability was also implied under
the Uniform Sales Act. The test for merchantability appears to be the
same as the consumer expectations test that is applied in strict products
liability in tort cases. A product is merchantable if it would 'pass
without objection in the trade under the contract description.' This
standard looks to the expectations of those in the trade, which would be
the same as the expectations of the ordinary consumer, unless the
expectations of consumers and producers in the trade differed.
Id. at n.31 (citing U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (1987)); John W. Wade, On the Nature
of Strict Torts Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 833-34 (1973)
(applying contract theory prior to implementation of strict liability "for
purchasers who might have had 'expectations' from the manufacturer or
supplier" (footnote omitted)); see also Gray v. Manitowoc Co., 771 F.2d 866,
869 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[C]onsumer expectation test of section 402A is rooted in
the warranty remedies of contract law, and requires that harm and liability
flow from a product characteristic that frustrates consumer expectations."
(citing Page Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST.
MARY's L.J. 30, 37 (1973))).
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been merchantable if the market had known about the hazard. 5 8

Is this a product that would have passed in the trade under the
trade description if the hazard had been known to the public?
Well, a car whose wheels fall off would not pass in the trade, 59

while some other defects would not amount to
unmerchantibility. 60 Either perspective can be relevant to the
issue of whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous" for
purposes of section 402A.
Against that background, we understood section 402A to be

simply a doctrine relative to liability for harm caused by defective products, which is derived in part from regular negligence
law, and similarly derived in part from regular warranty law,
both of which still exist today. 6 1 Now my real question regarding
the project that has been undertaken here is structural. Where is
the new material on section 402A intended to exist in relation to

negligence law and warranty law?
One possible application of this question relates to the issue of
"generic defect," 62 referred to by Professors Henderson and

58. The Uniform Commercial Code does not recognize a breach of implied
warranty of merchantability when there is an obvious danger or defect of
goods that were or should be examined. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) (1993).
59. See, e.g., Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987)
(applying "user-contemplation" test to find manufacturer liable for injuries to
worker caused by unmerchantable blade of metal scrap shears); Leichtamer v.
American Motors Co., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981) (applying consumer
expectation test to determine unmerchantability ofjeep roll bar).
60. See, e.g., Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co., 499 F.2d 191 (10th Cir.
1974) (holding manufacturer of washing machine not liable for injuries to
plaintiff because the danger was obvious to an ordinary consumer); Mexicali
Rose v. Superior Court, 822 P.2d 1292 (Cal. 1992) (finding that chicken bone
in chicken enchilada not unmerchantable where bone is a natural substance and
consumer could reasonably expect such natural substance); Koperwas v. Publix
Supermarkets, Inc., 534 So. 2d 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding the
maker and seller of clam chowder containing clam shell not liable for
unmerchantability because ordinary consumer could reasonably anticipate such
substance).
61. See supra notes 13-48 and accompanying text.
62. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Stargazing: The Future of American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1332, 1333 (1991). The authors note that generic defects are comprised
of "design defects and failures to warn." Id. (footnote omitted); Joseph A.
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Twerski. In determining whether there is strict liability for a
product, the analysis may be based on the Restatement regarding

negligence law or section 402A, or it may be based on whether
the conduct of people who market a product was unreasonable
under the circumstances. 63 If a business markets a product that
has no social utility and great social danger, it is perfectly con64 If
ceivable to bring a negligence action against them.

negligence is intended to be overtaken by a new handbook on
Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case against Comment k and for Strict
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853, 853 (1983). A generic defect has also been
defined as a "[risk] that [does] not derive from flaws in the manufacturing
process but from product design or from the very nature of the product." Id.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291, 292, 293 (1965). See
also A. WEINSTEIN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE
PRODUCT 17 (1978). The plaintiff of a products liability claim based on

negligence must establish that the conduct of a manufacturer was unreasonable.
Id.; Page, supra note 62, at 854-55. The author reports that claims of persons
injured by asbestos and DES had to prove that the manufacturers engaged in
unreasonable conduct. Id. at 855.
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291, 292, 293 (1965). To
determine negligence, §§ 291, 292 and 293 implement a balancing test
between the social utility of the product and its harm. Section 291 provides:
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as
involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act
is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law
regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is
done.
Id. § 291. Section 292 provides as factors to determining utility of an actor's
conduct:
(a) social value which the law attaches to the interest which is advanced
or protected by the conduct; (b) the extent of the chance that this
interest will be advanced or protected by the particular course of
conduct; (c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be adequately
advanced or protected by another and less dangerous course of conduct.
Id. § 292. Section 293 provides as factors to determining risk:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are
imperiled; (b) the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will
cause an invasion of any interest of the other or of one of a class of
which the other is a member; (c) the extent of the harm likely to be
caused to the interests imperiled; (d) the number of persons whose
interests are likely to be invaded if the risk takes effect in harm.
Id. § 293.
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products liability, so that a comprehensive view of products
liability is to be set forth in the new proposed sections, my
question is whether that will really fly in terms of ignoring the
dynamics of negligence law as being one of the major
components of our jurisprudence.
Similarly, to the extent the attempt is made to deny liability for
the product that is defective, in terms of its defective instructions
or the lack of foreseeability of the hazard, I cannot conceive of
the revision of the Restatement of Torts eliminating the potential
application of the Uniform Commercial Code to this claim. If the
attempt is going to be made to do that in this exercise, my prediction is that we will have further swinging of the pendulum, as
it was prior to the Restatement (Second), when it swung back and
forth between negligence law and warranty law as the basis of liability for harm caused by unreasonably dangerous products. In
the future, I imagine we will have a swing from tort, as the
queen of product liability law, to warranty law and the Uniform
Commercial Code reclaiming some of the strict liability for products that should be regarded as unmerchantable. I refer to the
grounds Professor Twerski identified, namely that if a particular
accident looks like Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,65 we
feel instinctively that there ought to be liability. 66 Of course, we
feel instinctively there ought to be liability, and the source is our
common law background from warranty law. Thank you.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you Professor Gray. Mr. Crofton, I cannot let your
statements about juries go uncommented. I do not have any
problem with the state system of selecting juries. It is wasteful.
Attorneys, of course, do not want impartial jurors. They want
jurors that are partial their way. Good advocacy normally would
cancel out the imperfections there. My own background, as a
practicing attorney, was almost exclusively trying non-jury cases.
65. 161 A.D.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying
text.
66. See Twerski, supra note 36, at 14.
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It is just the way it happened. I subscribed to the idea, "Oh, jurors, they do not know anything. You cannot rely on them because they blow with the wind and are very much swayed by
their emotions." When I became a district judge, I very quickly
developed a high respect for juries. I remember selecting juries in
the federal system by not taking the first group that came into the
box, but it did not come far from it. I believe this way provided a
quicker cross-section in terms of efficiency. However, the jurors
were selected. I spoke to many of them after trials, and, of
course, observed them through trials.
My personal conviction is that virtually all jurors try extremely
hard to do precisely what is asked of them. What is asked of
them is a combination of what the attorneys present to them, and
what the judge presents to them. If jurors are dismissed, because
they cannot understand the complexity of the products liability
case, I believe this is a criticism of the lawyers that try the case
to them. Jurors come with an orientation toward trying to understand the case. The level of education and intelligence of the jurors to whom I have been exposed, which is essentially Long Island jurors, is a level that is capable of understanding.
Of course, you may have to give jurors an education in a
course of relatively confined time periods of a trial. There are
lawyers who are extremely effective in structuring a case that
does educate them. Issues can be presented to a jury in terms of
special verdicts or interrogatories, depending upon the case. I
have presided over approximately three to four hundred trials,
most of them jury trials. In only two or three of those, I think the
jury was off the mark. My own contact with jurors has given me
a great respect for the jury system and for the ability of jurors to
deal with complex questions, not only questions of fact, but the
impossible questions that we give them, such as, who is lying.
The impossible questions of every lawsuit are the ones that are
given to the jury. The idea of instituting more rules of law so
judges can decide them is not one that I favor. The more you try
to characterize something as a rule of law, the more it tends to
become fact finding at the appellate level. I did not want to let
your comments go unchallenged. There is another view of the
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jury system, and Mr. Vargo, I sense you are itching to say
something.
Mr. John Vargo, Esq.:

You may forget about the plaintiff's view, the defendant's view
and the judge's view; however, please consider something that I
did not have time to discuss in my remarks. We should pay close
attention to very recent studies regarding the tort system of which
Professor Henderson has been a part. Recent empirical data have
shed light on the jury system. Thus, we finally have factual information which is not developed by either the plaintiff or defendant. This empirical data is from a sociologist, Professor Valerie
P. Hans, 67 who has performed the largest study of juries in our
country. I highly recommend that you read her book. Professor
Hans is not a plaintiff's witness or a defense's witness but has
produced factual data that refutes the old wive's tale that juries
favor plaintiffs. This has not been true for over ten years in this
country. Juries favor defendants in products liability actions
eighty-three percent of the time. 68
Furthermore, Professor Landes and Judge Posner performed a
study that clearly indicates that the number of products liability
punitive damage cases have been decreasing since 1986.69 I believe Professor Henderson has come to the same conclusion concerning all products liability cases. 70 All students should pay
67. Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business
Liability in Tort Cases: Implicationsfor the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26
LAW & Soc'y REv. 85 (1992).
68. Id. at 93-97. To be specific, tort jurors, having negative judgments
about lawsuits and litigation, believe that "[t]here are far too many frivolous
lawsuits today" 83 % of the time. Id. at 95.
69. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW

(1987).

70. Theodore Eisenberg and James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet
Revolution in ProductsLiability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731 (1992). The authors

report that products liability "plaintiffs probably remain better off than they
were before the mid-1960's, when modem products liability doctrine took
hold. Nonetheless, the indicators strongly suggest that products [liability]

plaintiffs are worse off today than they were in 1985." Id. at 770.
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close attention to such empirical datum, as they reflect what is
actually happening, rather than what is allegedly happening. I
also find it curious that there is such a concern about punitive
damages, since there have been five separate empirical studies
concerning punitive damages in products liability litigation.
These studies indicate
damage cases, and of
damages, almost half
American Law Institute

that there have been very few punitive
those juries which have awarded such
have been overturned. 7 1 I believe the
should attempt to develop more empirical

datum concerning its project on strict liability.
Michael Crofton, Esq.:

The jury system is not going to go away in the United States. It
is part of history 72 and there are very deep reasons why the
71. See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, EMPIRICAL PATrERNS IN
PUNITIVE DAMAGE

CASES:

A DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENCE RATES

AND

AWARDS 38 (1987) (reporting that punitive damages for products liability cases
were awarded only in 3.8% of 25,627 jury verdicts, and these awards were
proportionate to the actual damages); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD R.

POSNER, NEw LIGHT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 35-36 (Oct. 1986) (reporting that
state products liability judgments were upheld fewer than two percent of 119
cases, which is a percentage lower than in federal cases); MARK PETERSON ET
AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 30 (1987) (reporting that
"most large punitive damage awards were reduced by post-trial activity, and
only half of the money originally awarded by juries in the sampled cases
eventually ended up in plaintiffs' hands."); MICHAEL RUSTAD, DEMYSTIFYING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A SURVEY OF A QUARTER

CENTURY OF TRIAL VERDICTS 30 (1991) (reporting that since the 1970's
slightly more than half of the punitive damage awards at trial have been
reversed or decreased by appellate courts); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT
TO THE CHAIRMAN SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, CONSUMER PROTECTION,
AND COMPETITIVENESS, COMMISSION ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTION

IN FIVE STATES 38 (1989) (reporting that out of 12 punitive damage awards
reviewed by appellate courts, seven were reversed, two were affirmed and
three were vacated and remanded).
72. See Marvin E. Aspen, 72 JUDICATURE 254 (1989) (reviewing JOHN
GUNTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA (1988)) ("Indeed, the American jury trial
probably ranks with the flag, motherhood, apple pie and baseball as one of the
sacred symbols of contemporary Americana.").
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public would not tolerate a system without it. I do not suggest its
abolition. I suggest there are things that could be done to reform
it. 73

Jurors often sit through trials that take months. They do not
take notes. 74 They are then given a four, five or six-hour sum-

73. See generally William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132
F.R.D. 575 (1991). Judge Schwarzer suggests many changes at all stages of
litigation to help jurors better understand the details of lengthy and complex
trials. At the pretrial stage, Judge Schwarzer recommends the following
changes: issues should be narrowed down to those that are most important;
testimony and exhibits trimmed to avoid redundancy; specific time
requirements set by a judge in which a trial must be completed; all exhibits
marked and submitted before trial and all objections and other legal matters
argued after court hours. Id. at 577-79. At the jury selection stage of the trial,
Judge Schwarzer recommends the following: a non-random jury selection
process where each juror is selected to sit on a case because that juror's
education and background will best qualify that juror for that particular case;
questionnaires should be handed out to each juror before voir dire to get basic
information about each juror; have alternate jurors not sit in designated seats,
and at the end of the trial draw lots to decide which jurors will be dismissed so
all jurors must pay close attention throughout. Id. at 580-82. At the jury
instruction stage of the trial, Judge Schwarzer recommends the following:
judges should make short instructions and use plain language to better educate
juries about the law; give the jurors pre-argument instructions to give them a
good idea of what to expect during the trial; allow jurors to have a copy of the
jury instructions that the judge will read to them; require the jury to return a
special verdict that responds to questions dealing with material factual issues;
give jurors all relevant information concerning the case, including "insurance
coverage, dismissal of or settlement with other parties, or trebling of damages
in anti-trust cases." Id. at 582-87. Additionally, Judge Schwarzer would allow
jurors to be more active in the judicial process by allowing the following
changes: allow all juries to pick a foreperson whom they think will be a leader
during deliberations; encourage note-taking by jurors so they will better focus
on and remember the evidence presented; allow jurors to ask questions during
the trial to clear up any confusion that may not be known to the court; permit
jurors during the trial to talk among themselves about the case to help each
other better understand the evidence that was presented. Id. at 590-94.
74. See Aspen, supra note 72, at 254 ("[Tihe practice in a majority of our
trial courts is not to permit jurors to take notes, no matter how complex or
lengthy the trial.").
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mation in one shot. 75 Then they are charged. I believe in many

circumstances that, by that stage, jurors' minds are just incapable
of remembering what was said by any particular witness. Thus,
the system does not lend itself to careful objective analysis. What
often happens in a jury room is that the persons with the best
memories, who happen to be the most articulate, will end up per-

suading others as to their point of view. 76 Maybe we can have a
system of note-taking,7 7 or an agreement as to factual
memoranda being put before the jury by each side, basically
summing up what their case is, so that people can be kept up to
date on the facts on an ongoing basis.
Second, I do not believe that to suggest that Long Island jurors
are representative of jurors in the United States, in general, is
really fair. I have tried cases on Long Island and I have found

Long Island jurors to be terrific. Quite frankly, I think there is no
problem there. What happens however, in the way that the New
York State system works, is that you go to jury selection in New
York Supreme Court and initially, you start off with a very diverse group of people because they all received the same slip of
75. See generally Steven I. Milligram, Closing Arguments, in WINNING
THE SLIP AND FALL CASE, at 181, 184 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 462, 1993):
[L]ong-winded, repetitious summations are certain to bore the jury at
best and cost a victory at worst. The closing argument should be no
longer than the length of the trial and complexity of the issues
mandates. A three day trial should not require a sunnation that takes as
long to make as it took to present all the proof that the jury heard.
Id.
76. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Mogill & William R. Nixon, Jr., Ph.D., A
PracticalPrimer on Jury Selection, 65 MICH. B. J.52, 56-57 (1986) (noting
that certain individuals on the jury will take leadership positions and that "high
education, intellectual prowess, an articulate verbal style and the projection of
decisive thinking" are some of the qualifications those leaders often possess).
77. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror's Participation in
Trials:A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW
& HUMAN BEHAVIOR 231, 233 (1988). After reviewing several field studies on
juries, the authors noted that "[t]he obvious advantage of allowing juror
notetaking is that it will result in a jury that is better informed about the
evidence and the law during its deliberations--in short, jurors' notes can be
expected to serve as a useful memory aid." Id.
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paper. Those people that do not want to sit on the jury, or any
jury, during that time will not do so. They know what to say.
The small businessman who wants to get back to his job will
plead to be released for some generic reason such as, "I never
believe that a plaintiff should succeed," or "I distrust insurance
companies completely." One answer like that and he is off the
jury. He knows what to say and he says it.
The American public has a romantic love affair with the jury
system, but look how many people willingly want to take part in
it. Most people look for every possible reason to get out of the
jury system and brag about it. I get phone calls occasionally from
clients of mine saying, "I got called to jury selection," or "My
son got called for jury selection. Can you go down and speak to
the prosecutor?" Is this a country in love with the jury system?
When I made my remarks earlier, I said that if we believe that
juries should represent one's peers, let us put them in a room, no
exemptions, 7 8 attorneys, judges, doctors, everybody. It should be
compulsory to serve on juries, no excuses. Then you will get fair
representation. Then you will get trust. What you get today is
that by the time all these people have made their excuses and said
the things they know will get them out of the jury system, you
are left essentially with the dregs, what the trial lawyers talk
about as a "Friday panel." At the end of the week, you get the
real dregs, and it is a problem.
Another thing, if juries really were so fair and impartial, I present Mr. Vargo with some real empirical evidence. Why is it that
the plaintiffs' bar loves juries and the defense bar does not? I said
that my study was unscientific. However, I do not believe I spoke
78. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 512 (McKinney 1992). This section exempts
clergy and Christian Science practitioners, physicians, lawyers, dentists,
pharmacists, optometrists, psychologists, podiatrists, registered and practical
nurses, Christian Science nurses, embalmers, police officers, correctional
officers, firemen, solo proprietors, prosthetists, orthotists and licensed
physical therapists from jury duty. See generally Gary Spencer, Kaye Plans
Jury System Reforms: Panel Will Launch 'Innovative' Study, N.Y.L.J., Aug.
26, 1993, at 1 (noting that a committee, appointed by Chief Justice Kaye of the
New York Court of Appeals, will study whether statutory exemptions from
jury duty should be discontinued).
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to a single person who regularly does defense work who would

prefer to try a case in front of a jury rather than a judge. That is
empirical evidence, and that is a reflection on practitioners' impressions of how good or bad juries are in assessing factual material.
On the question of punitive damages, I do not believe that the
plaintiffs' bar is entirely innocent in its attitude. I believe it
would be innocent if the punitive damages did not go to its clients, the plaintiffs, but rather went to some cause, some public
cause. 79 I would be quite happy with that. If a manufacturer has
acted in a way that is flagrantly in violation of the public's safety,
let the punitive damages go to some research organization that
will do public work in that area. The plaintiff would still be fully
compensated. Currently, that does not happen. Punitive damages
go into the plaintiff's pocket and the plaintiffs attorney's
pocket. 80 Thank you.

79. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 8701 (McKinney Supp. 1993)
(requiring that 20% of punitive damages awarded in civil actions be paid to the
state). In addition, several state legislatures have adopted this approach and
passed legislation which requires a percentage of punitive damage awards be
"remitted to the public." See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The
Historical Continuity of Punitive Damage Awards: Reforming the Tort
Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1322-23 n.275 (1993). However, at
least two courts have struck down the statutes as an unconstitutional taking of a
property interest. See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563,
1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (holding unconstitutional a state statute that enables the
state to take 75% of all punitive damage awards in product liability cases);
Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 264 (Colo. 1991) (holding
unconstitutional a statutory requirement that one-third of exemplary damages
awarded be paid into state general fund).
80. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation:
The Injured Person'sAccess to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567, 1617 (1993)
(noting that "[p]laintiffs and their attorneys generally enter into contingent fee
agreements that provide for fees as a percentage, usually one-third, of the
amounts recovered in an action"). For additional information on contingent fee
agreements, see generally F. B. MAcKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL
SERVICES (1964).
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Hon. George C. Pratt:
I have often thought that punitive damages should be used for

the improvement of justice, such as increasing judges' salaries.
Are there any questions from the audience for the speakers or the
panel?
Audience Member

I would like to ask a question of Professor Twerski, but it was
mentioned by someone else. I am a student who is not as experienced as those on today's panel. However, after listening to the
discussion that there would be no liability held for design defect
for prescription drugs, 81 I cannot believe that liability has never

been imposed on Thalidomide or DES manufacturers. 82
Considering the fact that plaintiffs injured by those drugs had no
way of knowing their dangers, why should they not be
compensated? Can anyone address that?
ProfessorM. Stuart Madden:
I think there has been liability before comment k of section
402A 83 and after it. Under section 402A comment k, there is an
81. See Aaron D. Twerski, From A Reporter: A Prospective Agenda 10
TouRo L. REV. 5, 16-18 (1993).
82. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). Comment k
states:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An
outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies,
which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads
to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are
fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk
which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is
it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs,
vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot
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extrapolation from liability if the product is prepared and marketed as safely as possible. 84 In the Thalidomide and DES cases,
there was sufficient proof for a jury to conclude that the manufacturers were negligent in the manner in which they tested the
product prior to marketing. 85
legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a
physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental
drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even
of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable
risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they
are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id.
84. Id.
85. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980). In Sindell, the court found that:
[d]uring the period defendants marketed DES, they knew or should have
known that it was a carcinogenic substance, that there was a grave
danger after varying periods of latency it would cause cancerous and
precancerous growths in the daughters of the mothers who took it, and
that it was ineffective to prevent miscarriage. Nevertheless, defendants
continued to advertise and market the drug as a miscarriage
preventative. They failed to test DES for efficacy and safety; the tests
performed by others, upon which they relied, indicated that it was not
safe or effective. In violation of the authorization of the Food and Drug
Administration, defendants marketed DES on an unlimited basis rather
than as an experimental drug, and they failed to warn of its potential
danger.
Id. at 925-26; Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the
Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 313-15 (1992). The author
reports that Thalidomide was sold without a prescription and marketed around
the world in 1960. Id. at 313. Once the disastrous effects of Thalidomide were
revealed, the FDA withheld its approval until further testing proved the drug's
safety. Id. at 313-14. However, "[w]hile Thalidomide was still under review
by the FDA, 2,500,000 tablets were distributed and given to nearly 20,000
individuals, including 624 pregnant women. Ultimately, at least ten American
babies were born with defects attributed to Thalidomide." Id. at 314 (footnotes

omitted).
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ProfessorJames Henderson:
I am not allowed to tell you chapter and verse of what we are
doing, because we are only a couple of weeks away from sending
our revisions to the A.L.I. I will, however, tell you that we are
thinking very seriously in the direction of review, on a limited
basis, of drug design.
When I wrote the Cornell Law Review article, 86 I was of the
firm belief that drug design cases could never change. While I
cannot go into detail at this time, I can say that there is growing
authority to suggest that prescription drug design cases are not
out of the reach of section 402A. Furthermore, it is interesting to
note that at the last advisor's meeting, held in September, 1992,
there was a lot of sentiment that prescription drugs should not be
treated that much differently than other products. We are listening today, and your sentiment is shared not only with peers, but
with a growing number of courts.
Audience Member.
I would like to ask what effect this will have on tobacco litigation, particularly in light of the recent revelations about the tobacco industry's awareness of the known hazards of the product.
Was it this knowledge that prompted the failed attempt by Liggett
Group, Inc. and Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co., Inc. in 1981 to
develop the "smokeless cigarette," only to be told by their lawyers that it would not be good for business? 87

86. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A ProposedRevision of
Section 402,A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512

(1992).
87. See Michael F. McNamara, Comment, Smokeless Tobacco: Defective
Marketing Creates a New Toxic Tort, 21 TULSA L.J. 499 (1986) (discussing

product liability claims against smokeless cigarette manufacturers).
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Hon. George C. Pratt:
I question lawyers who have the temerity to tell their clients
what is good or bad business. It might create some legal problems with respect to other things that they were marketing.
Mr. John Vargo, Esq.:
I have a chapter in my treatise which covers this question. 88 In
it you will find the documents connected with Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 89 I think that these documents, which contain
quotes from counsel in that case, will answer your question.
ProfessorOscar S. Gray:
I think that the question really invokes recollections of what
Judge Pratt started off talking about in his initial remarks. It always helps to show culpability on the part of a defendant. To the
extent knowledge can be proven, negligence can be shown.
Moreover, to the extent that knowledge can be shown, you are
closer to being able to show fraud. So my answer would have to
be that I cannot definitively say what effect it will have. However, such renovations will surely be very positive in the plaintiffs' forum.
ProfessorM. Stuart Madden:
I interpreted the question to ask also what the effect would be
of proof of misrepresentation and concealment in the litigation of
the cigarette and tobacco product. I think that actual proof of
misrepresentation and concealment would operate to eliminate the
effectiveness of defendants' characteristic defense of assumption
88. JOHN F. VARGO, PRODucTs LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE ch. 42
(1989).
89. 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2609 (1992) (holding that the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act does not preempt state law damages action or
claims based on conspiracy, misrepresentation, intentional fraud and express
warranty).
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of the risk and would also operate to destroy many of the premises of implied preemption.
Audience Member:
Again, as a student, I am in a position where I can make a
comment which may be naive. It may be impudent, but it would
seem that the manufacturing industry's concerns regarding the
impact of strict liability could be mitigated in large part by
minimizing the amount of plaintiffs' recovery to what would reasonably compensate victims without punishing the defendants to
the extent that they are forced to go out of business.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
That is exactly what a jury is instructed to do if it finds damages.
Audience Member
Someone must have missed those instructions in the award
given in the recent case of Moseley v. GeneralMotors Corp.90
Hon. George C. Pratt:
In our next session, we will examine whether this award will
stand up.

90. 61 U.S.L.W. 2564 (Ga. State Ct. Feb. 26, 1993) (No. CA 90V6276)
(holding that a statute permitting Georgia 75% of $101 million punitive
damages award in a products liability case is unconstitutional).
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